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CASE LAW
A. Court of Justice
Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Third Chamber) of 5 May
2011, nyr;
Case C-256/11, Dereci and others v. Bundesministerium für Inneres,
Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 15 November 2011, nyr.
(Some of) The KidsAreAll Right
1. Introduction
The Court of Justice judgments in McCarthy and Dereci join a significant
minority of decisions constraining the scope of European Union citizenship.1
Generally, the impact of citizenship in the case law is rights-expanding, which,
many would argue, is entirely justified by the nature and purpose of
citizenship per se. In other words, when Member State nationals invoke EU
citizenship rights in claims against host (or even their own) Member States,
they tend to succeed. This trend has been strongly apparent in cases involving
rights of residence for family members (including third country national
family members) and it was confirmed by the Grand Chamber early in 2011,
in its controversial decision in Ruiz Zambrano.2 In that case, the Court found
that minor Union citizens who had no connection to another Member State
could nonetheless engage the protection of Union citizenship against the State
of their birth (and unbroken residence) to secure residence rights and work
permits there for their third country national parents.
1. The decision in Case C-158/07, Forster, [2008] ECR I-8507 is another prominent
example. In that case, the Court approved national limitations regulating access to student
maintenance grants; the restrictions were in line with EU legislative conditions, which were, at
the time, adopted but not yet in force. See Art. 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 2004 O.J.
L, 158/77.
2. Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, judgment (Grand Chamber) of 8 March 2011, nyr.
Common Market Law Review 49: 349–380, 2012.
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Against that broader trajectory, it is important to reflect on the
rights-limiting implications of McCarthy and Dereci. In both judgments, the
significance of establishing a cross-border connection was re-entrenched. Did
the Court set these limits in a coherent and appropriate way? This reflection
suggests that it did not, for two reasons: first, because of problems already
apparent in the Court’s strict delineation of its new “genuine enjoyment of the
substance of EU citizenship rights” test; and, second, because of the Court’s
failure to engage properly with standard thresholds established in other
strands of its own case law, notably (but not only) on the protection of
fundamental rights. The annotation first provides a brief outline of the
judgment in Ruiz Zambrano. It then presents an overview of the facts,
Opinions and judgments in McCarthy and Dereci. Following a discussion of
how we are now supposed to understand the “substance” of EU citizenship
rights, the analysis goes on to evaluate the performance of the Court in
institutional terms against benchmarks of coherence and legal certainty.
2. The judgment in Ruiz Zambrano
The Ruiz Zambrano case centred on derived rights to reside and work in
Belgium for the Columbian national parents of two minor children who,
having been born there, held (only) Belgian nationality.3 The critical point on
which the case turned was whether or not a connecting factor to EU law could
be established, given that the Union citizens – the Belgian children – had never
exercised Treaty rights to move and reside within the Union. A standard
application of EU lawwould generate rights of residence in any of the other 26
Member States in that situation (subject to demonstrating economic
self-sufficiency after the first three months4) but not in the Union citizens’
home State.5 In a comprehensive and stirring analysis of relevant EU law,
Advocate General Sharpston questioned the continuing legitimacy of the
resulting reverse discrimination (for static vis-à-vis migrant Union citizens),
the credibility of the wholly internal rule given the Court’s incremental
dilution of the concept of movement in any event, and the proper place of
fundamental rights in the EU’s distinctive constitutional order. In sum, she
3. In Case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen, [2004] ECR I-9925, the Court confirmed that minor
children are full beneficiaries of the status of Union citizenship, and that derived residence
rights in a host Member State should be granted to their (self-sufficient) primary carer. The
judgment in Ruiz Zambrano may have altered the latter concept to the parent(s?) on whom the
minor children are dependent (Ruiz Zambrano, cited supra note 2, paras. 43–44).
4. See Directive 2004/38, cited supra note 1, Articles 2, 6 and 7.
5. See e.g. Joined Cases C-64 & 65/96, Uecker and Jacquet, [1997] ECR I-3171.
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predicted that the Court would soon have “to confront the question of whether
the Union is not now on the cusp of constitutional change”.6
Addressing the substantive questions raised in the case, Advocate General
Sharpston proposed, first, that Articles 20 and 21 TFEU7 conferred
standalone rights of residence that are independent from the right tomove to or
between other Member States, thus bringing the Ruiz Zambrano children
within the personal scope of EU law. Second, she suggested that Article 18
TFEU should be interpreted as prohibiting reverse discrimination “caused by
the interaction ofArticle 21TFEU with national law that entails a violation of
a fundamental right protected under EU law, where at least equivalent
protection is not available under national law”.8 She thus constricted the
impact of the wholly internal rule, removing from its ambit situations
requiring the EU to intervene in order to protect the fundamental rights (here,
respect for family life) of EU citizens. Her arguments were bold; but they were
clear, and thoroughly rationalized.
The Court’s decisionwas distinctlymoremodest, but it nonetheless charted
new, controversial, territory. In a stunningly short judgment, the Grand
Chamber confirmed, first, that Directive 2004/38 could not apply, since
Article 3(1) clearly required movement to and/or residence in a State other
than the citizen’s State of nationality. Second, the Court recalled the
“fundamental” nature of Union citizenship.9 On that basis, it held that “Article
20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving
citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights
conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union”.10 The Court then
stated that the refusal of rights of residence and a work permit “has such an
effect”.11 Its reasoning unfolded (to some extent anyway) as follows:
“[i]t must be assumed that such a refusal would lead to a situation where
those children, citizens of the Union, would have to leave the territory of
6. Ruiz Zambrano, cited supra note 2, Opinion, para 177.
7. Art. 20 TFEU states that “[c]itizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person
holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the
Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.” The right to move and reside
freely within the territory of the Member States is noted in Art. 20(2)(a). Art. 21(1) TFEU
further provides that “[e]very citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely
within the territory of theMember States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in
the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect”.
8. Ruiz Zambrano, cited supra note 2, Opinion, para 150.
9. Citing Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, [2001] ECR I-6193, para 31; Case C-413/99,
Baumbast and R, [2002] ECR I-7091, para 82; Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, [2003] ECR
I-11613, para 22; Zhu and Chen, cited supra note 3, para 25; and Case C-135/08, Rottmann,
[2010] ECR I-1449, para 43.
10. Ruiz Zambrano, cited supra note 2, para 42 (emphasis added).
11. Ibid., para 43.
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the Union in order to accompany their parents. Similarly, if a work permit
were not granted to such a person, he would risk not having sufficient
resources to provide for himself and his family, which would also result in
the children, citizens of the Union, having to leave the territory of the
Union. In those circumstances, those citizens of the Union would, as a
result, be unable to exercise the substance of the rights conferred on them
by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union.”12
Although not asAdvocate General Sharpston had proposed, the Court in Ruiz
Zambrano did nudge the application of EU law into a tranche of otherwise
internal situations. Confusingly, it did not overrule any previous case law
pointing to the opposite conclusion (a point returned to below). Moreover, the
critical new test – “depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment
of the substance of their citizenship rights” – was undefined. The Court’s
supporting reference to Rottmann was cryptic: at the relevant passage (para
42), the earlier judgment refers to “a decision withdrawing [the applicant’s]
naturalization, adopted by the authorities of one Member State, and placing
him, after he has lost the nationality of anotherMember State that he originally
possessed, in a position capable of causing him to lose the status conferred by
[Article 20 TFEU] and the rights attaching thereto”. In Ruiz Zambrano, the
Court seems to be saying that the situation faced by the family was another
example of deprivation/genuine enjoyment. But it offered no ontological
profile of the test and no sense of its outer parameters. Nor did it engage or
refer to any evidence to support its factual assumptions.
Initial reaction in the literature was broadly positive with respect to the
substance of the decision, in appreciation of its rights-enhancing impetus; but
very critical of the Court’s methodology, given the absence of proper
reasoning.13 The then pending cases of McCarthy and Dereci thus became
fortuitous; here, surely, many unsettled questions would be answered.
Moreover, two of the judges that sat in the Grand Chamber for Ruiz Zambrano
were also members of the Third Chamber in McCarthy; and the Grand
Chamber sat again to hear Dereci through the accelerated procedure, eight
judges overlapping with the Ruiz Zambrano composition (although with a
different juge-rapporteur).
12. Ibid., para 44.
13. See e.g. Hailbronner and Thym, case note 48 CML Rev. 1253; Kochenov, “A real
European citizenship; a new jurisdiction test; a novel chapter in the development of the Union
in Europe”, 18 CJEL (2011, forthcoming); Van Eijken and De Vries, “A new route into the
promised land? Being a European citizen after Ruiz Zambrano”, 36 EL Rev. (2011), 704.
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3. The cases
3.1. The McCarthy case
The applicant, Shirley McCarthy, is a British national who was born and has
always resided in the United Kingdom. She also holds Irish nationality (her
mother was born in Ireland).14 The case stemmed from a refusal by the
Secretary of State for the Home Department in 2004 to issue a residence
permit to her on the basis of EU law i.e. as an Irish national residing in the UK.
That refusal was grounded in Regulation 5(1) of the (then operative)
Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2000, on the basis that
she was not a “qualified person” (i.e. a migrant worker, self-employed person,
or self-sufficient person – on the latter point, nationality and/or residence
issues aside, MrsMcCarthy was in receipt of State benefits from the UK); nor
was she exercising Treaty rights within the meaning of EU law.15 Through a
sequence of appeals, her case finally reached the Supreme Court (at that time,
the House of Lords).
The unusual step of applying for a residence permit from her home State on
the basis of EU lawwas taken not because of doubts about her own entitlement
to live in the UK,16 but because her husband, George McCarthy, is a Jamaican
national who did not have leave to remain there. Had the applicant been
granted a residence permit in the UK through the channel of EU citizenship,
her husband would have a virtually automatic (derived) right to reside there
with her as the spouse of an EU citizen. Mr McCarthy entered the UK as a
visitor for six months in 2002. He met the applicant and they married in
November of that year. Mr McCarthy applied for a residence card in his own
name, having been refused indefinite leave to remain; a second application
was refused in 2004, accompanied by a notice that he had no further basis on
which to remain in the UK.17
14. In her Opinion,A.G. Kokott noted thatMrsMcCarthy applied for her first Irish passport
only after her marriage (McCarthy, Opinion, para 11).
15. The Court of Appeal and Supreme Court later considered the situation of the applicant
with reference to the Immigration (European EconomicArea) Regulations 2006, in accordance
with para 5(1) of schedule 4 to those Regulations.
16. As the ECJ later confirmed, international law, as reaffirmed in Art. 3 of Protocol No 4
to the ECHR, “precludes a Member State from refusing its own nationals the right to enter its
territory and remain there for any reason…that principle also precludes thatMember State from
expelling its own nationals from its territory or refusing their right to reside in that territory or
making such right conditional” (McCarthy, para 29).
17. See decision of the Court of Appeal, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 641, para 3. The rejection of a further application for a
residence card brought his case before the Asylum and Immigration Appeal Tribunal, which
adjourned those proceedings pending the outcome of Mrs McCarthy’s case.
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Both theTribunal and Court ofAppeal acknowledgedMrsMcCarthy’s dual
nationality in terms of bringing her within the personal scope of EU law.18 It
was also acknowledged that the 2006 Regulations were adopted to transpose
Directive 2004/38 into national law, including its concept of “permanent
residence”.19 Article 16(2) of the Directive provides that the status of
permanent residence extends also “to family members who are not nationals
of a Member State and have legally resided with the Union citizen in the host
Member State for a continuous period of five years”. Mr McCarthy could not
come within the scope of Article 16(2). But if Mrs McCarthy obtained a
residence permit from the UK on the basis of the Directive, then Mr
McCarthy’s status would be regularized as the spouse of a lawfully resident
EU citizen; all that would then be needed for him to acquire permanent
residence is time.
The glitch in this line of argument was that Mrs McCarthy had never
“moved” within the meaning of EU law. Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38
states that it applies to (or, its “beneficiaries” are) “all Union citizens who
move to or reside in aMember State other than that ofwhich they are a national
and to their family members” (defined in Art. 2 and including spouses of any
nationality). But Mrs McCarthy met neither of the conditions in Article 3.
Additionally, while Article 16 is focused on continuous and lawful residence,
it expressly refers to a “host” Member State. Notwithstanding arguments
about the broader intentions of the Directive and the rights-enhancing quality
of EU citizenship more generally, neither theTribunal nor the Court ofAppeal
were persuaded that a residence permit could be claimed against the
applicant’s home State under Directive 2004/38 on the sole basis of holding
dual nationality.20 At the final stage of her case in the domestic courts, the
House of Lords referred two questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary
ruling:
18. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Pill observed that the Tribunal had considered the
case for a second time precisely because it had not taken account of the applicant’s dual
nationality in its initial decision (ibid., para 7).
19. SeeArt. 16(1) of Directive 2004/38 (cited supra note 1), which entitles EU citizens who
have resided lawfully for a continuous period of five years in a host Member State to a right of
permanent residence there. Recital 17 of the preamble to the Directive characterizes permanent
residence as “strengthen[ing] the feeling of Union citizenship and [as] a key element in
promoting social cohesion, which is one of the fundamental objectives of the Union”. Two
critical features of the right to permanent residence are, first, the removal of the self-sufficiency
conditions in Art. 7 of the Directive as preconditions to lawful residence in the host State and,
second, enhanced protection against expulsion from that State (Art. 28).
20. Somewhat tantalizingly, Lord Justice Pill in the Court of Appeal did not find that “the
Directive invariably imposes a requirement that there is movement from one country to another
and that ‘the movement required excludes the appellant’” (judgment cited supra note 17, para
33); but no further explanation of this statement was given.
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1. Is a person of dual Irish and [British] nationality who has resided in the
United Kingdom for her entire life a “beneficiary” within the meaning
of Article 3 of Directive 2004/38/EC?
2. Has such a person “resided legally” within the host Member State for
the purpose of Article 16 of Directive 2004/38/EC in circumstances
where she was unable to satisfy the requirements of Article 7 of that
directive?
In addition to the submissions of the applicant and the United Kingdom,
Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, the Netherlands and the Commission all submitted
written observations to the Court. No other party argued in support of Mrs
McCarthy’s claim that dual nationality was a sufficient connecting factor to
EU law in the circumstances of her case.21
3.1.1. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott
Advocate General Kokott delivered her Opinion on 25 November 2010. She
confirmed at the outset that no claim to movement under any relevant Treaty
provisions was asserted in the case;22 dual nationality was the only connection
to EU law being raised. On the first question, reviewing the wording ofArticle
3(1), theAdvocate General reasoned that “Directive 2004/38 does not apply to
the relationship of Union citizens with the Member State of which they are a
national and in which they have always resided”.23 She drew support for this
interpretation from the broader aim of the Directive – i.e. facilitation of free
movement – and from the enshrinement of the right to move in primary Union
law, in Article 21(1) TFEU and Article 45(1) of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights. Advocate General Kokott then confirmed two fundamental tenets of
existing case law: first, claims against an applicant’s home State can be made
so long as movement either is being or has in the past been exercised, or is a
future prospect;24 but, second, inversely, static EU citizens cannot support
claims for family reunification in their home States using EU law.25
She went on to consider whether dual nationality was, in and of itself,
sufficient to displace the second strand of case law. Recalling the decision in
21. McCarthy, Opinion, para 23.
22. i.e. Arts. 21(1) (citizenship), 45 (work), 49 (establishment) or 56 (services) TFEU;
McCarthy, Opinion, para 22.
23. McCarthy, Opinion, para 25 (emphasis in original).
24. A.G. Kokott cited Cases C-370/90, Singh, [1992] ECR I-4265, C-291/05, Eind, [2007]
ECR I-10719 and C-60/00, Carpenter, [2002] ECR I-6279 on the former point, and Case
C-33/07, Jipa, [2008] ECR I-5157 on prospective movement.
25. Citing Joined Cases 35& 36/82,Morson and Jhanjan, [1982] ECR 3723. InUecker and
Jacquet, cited supra note 5, the Court confirmed that the introduction of EU citizenship had not
affected that case law.
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GarciaAvello,26Advocate General Kokott recognized the significance of dual
nationality in a situation involving the legal recognition of names, given that a
person’s name is an “essential element of his identity” and mindful of the
“serious inconvenience at a private or professional level” that a Union citizen
might suffer if national rules demanded different versions of that name.27 In
seeking to draw an analogy to the present case, she suggested that the only
relevant question was whether “the position of Union citizens differs, in view
of their dual nationality, in a legally relevant way from the situation of other
Union citizens who are nationals of the host Member State only.”28 Mrs
McCarthy was not being treated any differently, regarding residence rights for
her spouse, than British nationals in a comparable situation.This ledAdvocate
General Kokott to reflect briefly on reverse discrimination, since static EU
citizens could not claim derivative spousal residence rights in the way that
migrant EU citizens clearly could. She referred to the Opinion of Advocate
General Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano, still pending at the time, which had
called into question the legitimacy of reverse discrimination against the
broader evolution of EU citizenship.29 While not saying never, Advocate
General Kokott suggested that “the present case does not appear to me to
provide the right context for detailed examination of the issue of
discrimination against one’s own nationals.”30 The critical point here, in her
view, was Mrs McCarthy’s dependence on State benefits, since a mobile EU
citizen in the same situation could not claim residency under Directive
2004/38 either (recalling the self-sufficiency conditions in Art. 7).
Addressing the second question, the meaning of “legal residence” under
Article 16 of the Directive, Advocate General Kokott drew a connection of
logic to the reasoning summarized above: someone must come within the
scope of Article 3(1) to be eligible for permanent residence under Article 16.
She suggested that allowing a citizen in Mrs McCarthy’s position to establish
permanent residence while not requiring her to meet the conditions of
movement or self-sufficiency “would ultimately result in ‘cherry-picking’
[which] does not accord with the spirit and purpose of the provisions of EU
law on freemovement and the right of residence.”31 In a postscript reminiscent
of the judgment in Akrich, Advocate General Kokott did remind the referring
court of the UK’s distinct obligations under the European Convention on
26. Garcia Avello, cited supra note 9.
27. McCarthy, Opinion, para 34.
28. McCarthy, Opinion, para 35.
29. See generally, Spaventa, “Seeing the wood despite the trees? On the scope of Union
citizenship and its constitutional effects”, 45 CML Rev. (2008), 13.
30. McCarthy, Opinion, para 43.
31. Ibid., para 56.
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HumanRights and, in particular, of the right to respect for family life inArticle
8(1), as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.32
3.1.2. The judgment in McCarthy
Initially, the judgment in McCarthy follows the reasoning of Advocate
General Kokott. The Court did not consider that a “literal, teleological or
contextual interpretation” of Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38 could bring a
citizen who has never moved within its scope, irrespective of that citizen’s
dual nationality.33 But the Court did not stop there. Rather, it “reformulated”
the second question, effectively ignoring Article 16 of the Directive and
asking instead “whetherArticle 21TFEU is applicable to a Union citizen who
has never exercised his right of movement, who has always resided in a
Member State and who is also a national of another Member State.”34 The
latter criterion constitutes a distinct feature of Mrs McCarthy’s claim
compared to the situation of the Ruiz Zambrano children, who held one
nationality only. It should also be noted that the Third Chamber framed its
discussion around Article 21, not Article 20, TFEU.
The Court first restated its case law on situations confined to one Member
State; in other words, it affirmed the continuing relevance of the wholly
internal rule as a general benchmark for the triggering of EU citizenship
rights. It observed that Mrs McCarthy’s situation could not necessarily be
“assimilated” to a purely internal one, drawing from Ruiz Zambrano and the
“genuine enjoyment” test created there. But the Court then stated categorically
that:
“…no element of the situation of Mrs McCarthy, as described by the
national court, indicates that the national measure at issue in the main
proceedings has the effect of depriving her of the genuine enjoyment of the
substance of the rights associated with her status as a Union citizen, or of
impeding the exercise of her right to move and reside freely within the
territory of the Member States, in accordance with Article 21 TFEU.”35
The Court found thatMrsMcCarthy was not “obliged” to leave the territory of
the Union as a result of the contested national decision since she has an
unconditional right to reside in the UK under international law. It also referred
to the contrasting, in its view, surname/identity decisions inGarciaAvello and
32. Ibid., paras. 58–60; Case C-109/01, Akrich, [2003] ECR I-9607, paras. 58–60.
33. McCarthy, paras. 31–43.
34. McCarthy, para 44.
35. McCarthy, para 49.
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(later) Grunkin and Paul,36 noting that the “serious inconvenience” that
stemmed from dual nationality in those cases was liable to constitute an
obstacle to free movement, and did have the effect of depriving Union citizens
of the genuine enjoyment of their rights (a third example, then?) – but this was
materially different, in the Court’s view, from the situation faced by Mrs
McCarthy, who could presumably remain in the UK without her husband or
move to any of the other 26Member Stateswithout impediment in order to live
with him. Neither of these solutions was articulated expressly in McCarthy;
but the choices at stake provide the backdrop forDereci, which was pending at
the time of theMcCarthy judgment. The extent to which those choices could
actually be realized in practice is returned to, however, in section 4.1.2. below.
3.2. The Dereci case
Dereci concerns a series of refusals to grant residence permits to third country
national family members of Austrian nationals who had never exercised EU
freemovement rights.A key feature of the applicable national law (the Federal
Law on establishment and residence inAustria or “NAG”, in force since 1 Jan.
2006) is that third country national applicants for residence permits must
remain outside the territory ofAustria pending decision on their applications.
The reference in Dereci incorporates five different national cases, which can
be summarized as follows:
1. A Turkish national who entered Austria illegally (2001) and subse-
quently married an Austrian national (2003), with whom he has three
minor children who are all Austrian nationals (Mr Dereci);37
2. A Sri Lankan national who married an Austrian national in 2006 and
then entered Austria (legally) in February 2007, whose application for a
residence permit was rejected on the ground that, following the expiry
of her initial visa, she should have left and remained outside the
territory of Austria pending a decision on her residence permit ap-
plication (Mrs Heiml);
3. An individual from Kosovo (whose nationality is not made clear) who
entered Austria legally in 1984 with his parents (then Yugoslavian
36. Case C-353/06, Grunkin and Paul, [2008] ECR I-7639.
37. A question relating specifically to the situation of Mr Dereci, on the nature of standstill
clauses in the context of theAssociationAgreement between the Union and Turkey, will not be
addressed in this comment for reasons of space. It is important to note, however, that Mr
Dereci’s status as aTurkish national differentiated his situation from that of the other applicants
with respect to the more restrictive implications of the NAG: see paras. 76–101 of the judgment
of the Court; for comment, see Eisele and Van der Mei, “Portability of Social Benefits and
Reverse Discrimination of EU Citizens vis-à-vis Turkish Nationals: Comment on Akdas”, 37
EL Rev. (2012) forthcoming.
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nationals, but whose mother is now an Austrian national) and had a
valid residence permit until 2006, whose renewed application for a
residence permit in 2007 was rejected on the ground that he should have
left and remained outside Austria pending a decision on his application
(Mr Kokollari);
4. A Nigerian national who entered Austria illegally in 2003 (and had
made an asylum application on the basis of false statements), married
an Austrian national and applied for a residence permit in 2005, whose
application was rejected because he had not left Austria while that
decision was pending and, additionally, on public order grounds with
respect to his infringement of asylum rules (Mr Maduike);
5. A Serbian national living in Serbia with her husband and adult children,
who applied for a permit to reside in Austria to be reunited with her
father, an Austrian national, but whose application was rejected inter
alia on the grounds that her father could not cover her subsistence (Mrs
Stevic).
In all of the first four cases, expulsion orders had been issued against the
applicants. There are various differences among them too, however: legal
entry to Austria (Heiml, Kokollari) and illegal first entry (Dereci, Maduike);
continued unlawful residence (all except Stevic); different family
relationships (spouse and minor children (Dereci); spouse only (Heiml and
Maduike); parent and adult child (Kokollari and Stevic)); and the question
(and/or extent) of economic dependency (raised in all of the cases except
Maduike).38
In rejecting all of the applications,39 the Bundesministerium für Inneres
(Ministry for HomeAffairs) ruled out the relevance ofArticle 8 ECHR and/or
Union law, the latter on the basis that all of the situations were purely internal
to Austria. Nevertheless, the referring court (the Verwaltungsgerichtshof), in
order to resolve appeals against those decisions, sought guidance from the
Court of Justice on the scope of the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano through a
series of questions tailored to the different circumstances (family member
status, degree of dependency, etc.) of each case. In essence, the questions
sought to have themeaning of that judgment’s deprivation/genuine enjoyment
test clarified. All of the Governments that submitted observations40 with the
exception of one (Greece) refuted the argument that the situations in any of the
38. This summary draws from the helpful classification outlined by A.G. Mengozzi at
para 5.
39. The various reasons given for these decisions are summarized at para 28 of the
judgment.
40. i.e. Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK; as well as
the Commission.
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cases either impacted on the enjoyment of the substance of EU citizenship
rights or impeded the exercise of movement and residence rights within the
territory of the Member States. In their view, as captured by the Court in its
framing of the national court’s questions, the crux of the cases is that the
families “wish, primarily, to live together”.41
3.2.1. The View of Advocate General Mengozzi42
Advocate General Mengozzi agreed with the referring court that “it is
necessary to gain a better understanding of the implications of
the . . . judgment inRuiz Zambrano.”43 Following a brief exposition of the key
points in that judgment and also in McCarthy, he similarly ruled out the
application of Directive 2004/38 to any of the situations inDereci, and/or any
threat to the enjoyment of the substance of Union citizenship rights, and/or
any impediments to movement and residence in the territory of the Member
States. In the case of Mr Dereci, for example, his wife, an Austrian national,
could remain inAustria or move to any of the other Member States even if Mr
Dereci were to be expelled to Turkey. In that regard, the Advocate General
disputed a claim made as to the family’s dependency onMr Dereci.44 He then
drew an analogy between the situations of Mrs Heiml and Mr Maduike and
that of Mrs McCarthy, in that Mr Heiml and Mrs Maduike (both Austrian
nationals in “stable employment in Vienna”45) could similarly continue to
reside in Austria or move to another Member State without impediment.
Finally, he pointed out that neither Mr Kokollari’s mother nor Mrs Stevic’s
father were dependent on their adult children and would thus not have to leave
the territory of the Union if residence permits in Austria were not granted to
those applicants either.
The Advocate General then expressed a critical point that was absent from
the judgments in Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy: “[t]he foregoing
conclusions . . . are based on the premiss that ‘the substance of the rights
attaching to the status of European Union citizen’ . . . does not include the
right to respect for family life enshrined in Article 7 [of the Charter] and in
Article 8(1) of the ECHR.”46 In this regard, he recalled the limitations set out
41. Dereci, para 31.
42. Since the case was processed under the accelerated procedure,A.G.Mengozzi’s “view”
(which is dated 29 Sept. 2011) was published after the judgment of the Court.
43. Dereci, A.G. Mengozzi, para 17.
44. Ibid., para 34.
45. Ibid., para 35.
46. Ibid., para 37 (emphasis added). He expressed the point in another way in para 38,
pointing out that “the right to respect for family life appears to be insufficient, in itself, to bring
within the scope of Union law the situation of a Union citizen who has not exercised his right of
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in Article 51(2) of the Charter, which emphasizes that the Charter “does not
establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or modify
powers and tasks defined by the Treaties”. But he was open about the
“stumbling blocks, or at least . . . paradoxes”47 generated by this approach,
especially the de facto forcedmovement away from one’s own Member State
in order to engage EU rights of residence for third country national family
members (discussed in section 4). Note the following proviso, however, which
becomes important for arguments developed later:
“[I]f Mrs Dereci were, for whatever reason, unable to work and thus to
provide for the needs of her children, I believe that therewould be a serious
risk that the refusal to issue a residence permit to her husband and, a
fortiori, his expulsion toTurkey would deprive the couple’s children of the
genuine enjoyment of the substantive rights attaching to citizenship of the
Union by forcing them, de facto, to leave the territory of the Union. How
could a mother of three young children without her own resources, despite
the right of residence in Austria which she enjoys by virtue of her
nationality, take care of her children if she is unable to work and, therefore,
also unable to settle permanently in anotherMember Statewith her family
members?”48
He gave a potentially generous interpretation to dependency, which, in his
view, embraces economic, legal, administrative or emotional dependence, and
which “could expose that citizen to the same risk . . . of having to leave the
territory of the Union”49 – here, the factual scenario he used was that of a third
country national on whom a Union citizen parent is dependent. Importantly,
Advocate General Mengozzi also acknowledged the downside, from the
perspective of legal certainty, of the inevitable case-by-case refining of the
scope of Ruiz Zambrano that would emerge through still more preliminary
references.50
3.2.2. The judgment in Dereci
The Court recast the first multi-part question from the referring court as one
pivotal query: “whether European Union law and, in particular, the provisions
concerning citizenship of the Union, must be interpreted as precluding a
free movement and/or, as the case may be, has not been deprived of the genuine enjoyment of
one or other of the rights set out in Article 20(2)(b) to (d) TFEU”.
47. Ibid., para 43.
48. Ibid., para 47 (emphasis added).
49. Ibid., para 48.
50. He noted Joined Cases C-356/11,O and S, and C-357/11, L, (O.J. 2011, C 269/36), still
pending.
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Member State from refusing to grant residence within its territory to a third
country national, although that third country national wishes to reside with a
family member who is a European Union citizen, resident in that Member
State and a national of that Member State, who has never exercised his right to
free movement and who is not maintained by that third country national”.51
First, unsurprisingly, the Court ruled out the application of Directive 2004/38,
following the reasoning in McCarthy, discussed above.52 Second, the Court
addressed the applicability of the Treaty provisions on Union citizenship. It
reiterated the formulation inMcCarthy that non-exercise of movement rights
did not imply “assimilation” to a purely internal situation and reconfirmed the
Ruiz Zambrano deprivation/genuine enjoyment test, referring to Article 20
TFEU on both points. Significantly, the Grand Chamber then stated overtly
what was implicit inMcCarthy: that deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of
the substance of citizenship rights is triggered when a Union citizen “has, in
fact, to leave not only the territory of the Member State of which he is a
national but also the territory of theUnion as awhole”.53TheCourt continued:
“[T]he mere fact that it might appear desirable to a national of a Member
State, for economic reasons or in order to keep his family together in the
territory of the Union, for the members of his family who do not have the
nationality of a Member State to be able to reside with him in the territory
of the Union, is not sufficient in itself to support the view that the Union
citizen will be forced to leave Union territory if such a right is not
granted.”54
The Court went on to determine whether the right to respect for family life
affected that conclusion. In line with Advocate General Mengozzi, however,
the Court focused on Article 51(2) of the Charter, and advised the national
court that it needed first to establish whether any of the situations at issue fell
within the scope of Union law, as delimited above, before evaluating only then
whether respect for family life had been undermined. In a now familiar parting
word, the Court then reminded everyone that, with respect to situations outside
the scope of Union law, “[a]ll the Member States are, after all, parties to the
ECHR”.55
51. Dereci, para 37.
52. The application of Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 Sept. 2003 on the right to family
reunification (O.J. 2003, L 251/12) was also excluded, since it is not addressed to Union
citizens.
53. Dereci, para 66.
54. Dereci, para 68 (emphasis added).
55. Dereci, para 73.
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4. Comment
The decisions in McCarthy and Dereci do illuminate the judgment in Ruiz
Zambrano. On the positive side, they engage with rather than evade
established case law on thewholly internal rule; they demonstrate institutional
awareness of the limits of judicial law-making and the boundaries marked by
instruments of primary Union law; and they seek to refine a core new premise
of EU citizenship law: the deprivation/genuine enjoyment test. But then, the
Court fails properly to consider the implications of possible impediments to
movement in either case. The scope of the “genuine enjoyment” test seemed
wider in McCarthy than the more constricted version just weeks later in
Dereci. The judgment inMcCarthy completely ignored the right to respect for
family life; in Dereci, the Court did discuss it but significantly curtailed its
application (even compared to its own previous jurisprudence – the recent
decisions are crucial, but they hardly exist in a vacuum). In Ruiz Zambrano
andMcCarthy, the Court pronounced its own findings of “fact”; in Dereci, it
acknowledges that this is the domain of the national court, but factual
presumptions clearly steered both the conclusions reached and the reasoning
built around them anyway.
This very mixed assessment will now be elaborated under two broad
headings: first, an evaluation of the substance of EU citizenship rights after
McCarthy and Dereci; and, second, a reflection on what the judgments tell us
about the Court’s approach to reasoning.
4.1. The emerging profile of EU citizenship
The lineage of case law on EU citizenship is both dense and rich, as is the
significant body of scholarship synthesizing the key moments or constructing
normative paradigms around its practice and potential.56 The analysis in this
section concentrates on what the decisions inMcCarthy andDereci add to our
understanding of the legal scope of the status, especially of the rights that it
confers on EU nationals and/or their family members. One general point
confirmed by both cases is that citizenship rights are not contained exclusively
56. In addition to the references cited supra in notes 13 and 29, see recently e.g. Shaw,
“Citizenship: Contrasting dynamics at the interface of integration and constitutionalism” in
Craig and De Búrca, (Eds.) The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2011), p. 575;
Wollenschläger, “A new fundamental freedom beyond market integration: Union citizenship
and its dynamics for shifting the economic paradigm of European integration”, 17 ELJ (2011),
34; see further, Nic Shuibhne, “The resilience of EUmarket citizenship”, 47 CMLRev. (2010),
1597;Tryfonidou, “In search of the aim of the EC freemovement of persons Provisions: Has the
Court of Justice missed the point?”, 46 CMLRev. (2009), 1591; Kostakopoulou, “Ideas, norms
and European citizenship: Explaining institutional change”, 68 MLR (2005), 233.
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within Directive 2004/38.57 But the central substantive development – the
evolving meaning and implications of the deprivation/genuine enjoyment test
– is the primary focus here. Following an assessment of what the judgments do
say, section 4.1.2. then considers what they do not, focusing on the strangely
muffled treatment of actual or potential impediments to prospective
movement.
4.1.1. Refining the “substance” of citizenship rights
Article 20 TFEU establishes citizenship of the Union; this objective seeks,
according to Article 2 TEU, “to strengthen the protection of the rights and
interests of the nationals of its Member States”. As noted above, the right to
move and reside freely “within the territory of the Member States” is
expressed inArticles 20(2)(a) and 21(1)TFEU.We know from the judgment in
Rottmann that deprivation of citizenship status in a literal sense – through the
withdrawal ofMember State nationality – falls within the “genuine enjoyment
of the substance of citizenship rights” test: if you cannot even access the status,
then deprivation of the rights attached to it becomes a secondary (or rather,
immaterial) question. The Court in Rottmann phrased this as follows: “the
situation of a citizen of the Union who . . . is faced with a decision
withdrawing his naturalization . . . placing him . . . in a position capable of
causing him to lose his status conferred by Article 20 TFEU and the rights
attaching thereto falls, by reason of its nature and consequences, within the
ambit of EU law.”58
In Ruiz Zambrano, the issue was a level “down” from actual loss of the
status of EU citizenship. The Ruiz Zambrano children were not about to lose
their Belgian (thus Member State) nationality; but if their departure from the
territory of the Unionwas the consequence of enforcing the contested national
measure, then this, the Court held, would deprive them, too, of the genuine
enjoyment of the substance of their citizenship rights. Advocate General
Sharpston remarked that the children could still enjoy diplomatic and consular
protection from other Member States in any third country in which they might
end up residing; they could also access the rights detailed inArticles 20(2)(d)
57. In both cases, the broader scope of Arts. 20 and/or 21 TFEU (in other words, the
primary sources of citizenship rights) was considered after the applicability of theDirectivewas
ruled out; in other strands of case law, family member rights that could not be derived from
citizenship at all continue to be grounded in e.g.Art. 45TFEU and the status of workers (see e.g.
Joined Cases C-22 & 23/08, Vatsouras and Koupatantze, [2009] ECR I-4585, Case C-310/08,
Ibrahim, [2010] ECR I-1065, and Case C-480/08, Teixeira, [2010] ECR I-1107).
58. Rottmann, cited supra note 9, para 42 (emphasis added).
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and 24 TFEU.59 But the Advocate General and the Court effected, on the
surface at least, a qualitative hierarchy of norms through privileging the rights
to move and reside – the undoubted “core rights” of citizenship, according to
Advocate General Sharpston.60 In Ruiz Zambrano, the Court conceived the
“substance” of citizenship rights to capture this.Where genuine enjoyment of
that substance is threatened by national action, the veil of internal situations
may legitimately be pierced. The protective shield of EU citizenship will then
kick in to secure a right of home State residence for Union citizens and the
family members on whom they are dependent. There is no need to establish
any additional connecting factor to EU law through, for example, prior
exercise of movement or residence rights; nor is there any need to invoke an
assertion of discriminatory treatment (or, therefore, to consider any real or
hypothetical comparator). In Ruiz Zambrano, the Treaty provision invoked as
the basis for this new test was Article 20 TFEU. We saw above that primary
Union law confers a very open right to reside “within the territory of the
Member States”. In otherwords, there is no “except in your own State” proviso
in the Treaty itself.
Up to this point, then, a coherent test was emerging. That test, though
ground-breaking, was also compatible with the boundaries of the Treaty
provisions on citizenship. Tentatively in Rottmann and more overtly in Ruiz
Zambrano, the Court (finally) detached two sets of circumstances from the
wholly internal rule.61 It established the primacy of EU citizenship law over
nationalmeasures that either threaten the loss of the status of citizenship per se
or deprive citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of associated
rights. But the factual example distilled from Ruiz Zambrano62 – forced
departure from the territory of the Union – was clearly at the high end of how
many thought the Court might progress its deciphering of the “substance”
criterion in future cases. Confining its scope to forced departure from the
Union suggested a character of crisis, of last resort situations. That profile
seemed unduly restrictive from the perspective of construing citizenship as a
rights-enhancing status, especially in contemplation of the depth of legal
59. I.e. to petition the European Parliament, apply to the European Ombudsman, and to
address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages (and
receive a reply in the same language).
60. Ruiz Zambrano, Opinion, para 80. Freedom of movement and residence was described
as the “central right of citizenship” byA.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer (Joined Cases C-11 & 12/06,
Morgan and Bucher, [2007] ECR I-9161, para 67 of the Opinion).
61. For a comprehensive, cross-freedom account of the wholly internal rule, see
Tryfonidou, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law (Kluwer Law International, 2009); for a recent
(re)appraisal, see O’Leary, “The past, present and future of the purely internal rule in EU law”,
in Dougan, Nic Shuibhne and Spaventa (Eds.), Empowerment and Disempowerment of the
European Citizen, (forthcoming, Hart Publishing, 2012).
62. Though not necessarily correctly in that case, a point returned to below.
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protection that opens up through very minor catalysts of movement –
including prospective movement not yet concretely (or required to be)
identified.63 But given the seismic constitutional shift involved in the Court’s
overt review of any internal situations at all, a very high threshold is perhaps
merited – not least in the interests of generating sufficient legitimacy for this
new EU jurisdiction. It is also worth noting that the Court (even after
McCarthy and Dereci) still does not speak of a positive right to live in the
Union territory, in the way that Advocate General Sharpston did in Ruiz
Zambrano; it prefers a negative casting of the right not to be forced to leave it.
Things start to fall apart, however, when the judgment inMcCarthy is added
to the mix. The Court first restated the wholly internal rule, but rather than
confirming Ruiz Zambrano as an exception, it said instead that
deprivation/genuine enjoyment situations “cannot be assimilated to a purely
internal situation”.64 This construction adds an unhelpful layer of ambiguity
around what actually happened in Ruiz Zambrano. The motivation behind the
Court’s caution in McCarthy may be driven by (appropriate) concerns about
the boundaries of competence, but linguistic gymnastics can end up doing
more harm than good – not least for the Court’s reputation and credibility.
There is no “assimilation” formula needed here – in Ruiz Zambrano, it was a
purely internal situation; but a particularly serious one, according to the Court.
What the Court then emphasized in both McCarthy and Dereci is that being
forced to leave a particular Member State, but not the territory of the Union,
does not deprive an EU citizen of the substance of his or her rights. The
precedent set by Ruiz Zambrano was thus confined as tightly as it could be.
But problems emerge when that finding is blended back into EU law more
generally, especially with respect to prospectivemovement rights and the right
to respect for family life.
In McCarthy, the deprivation/genuine enjoyment test was presented as a
distinct test, additional to (or perhaps more accurately, beyond) the
conventional standard of “impeding the exercise of right[s] to move and reside
freely within the territory of the Member States”.65 In Dereci, the Court
focused exclusively on the deprivation/genuine enjoyment test, with no
discussion at all of actual or possible impediments to movement and/or
63. The indeterminate “liable to impede” and “deter” understandings of an obstacle to
movement are firmly established in EU law on the freemovement of persons; in citizenship case
law specifically, see e.g. Case C-224/02, Pusa, [2004] ECR I-5763, para 19; Case C-520/04,
Turpeinen, [2006] ECR I-10685, para 21; and Case C-499/06, Nerkowska, [2008] ECR I-3993,
para 33. In Ruiz Zambrano, A.G. Sharpston reasons this finding through discussion of Chen,
Garcia Avello and Rottmann (see paras. 69–78 of her Opinion in particular); this point is
discussed again infra.
64. McCarthy, para 46, (emphasis added).
65. McCarthy, para 49.
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residence rights. This is a critical point of disjointedness, not only as regards
Ruiz Zambrano,McCarthy andDereci, but also having regard to the weight of
EU case law generally. In the first case, we see no need for movement; in the
second, movement is considered but there is a problematic rejection of the
possibility that theremight be any impediment to it; and in the third, there is no
discussion of it at all. Is it not somewhat ironic, to say the least, that the
supposedly sacrosanct purely internal barrier was breached only then to have
decisions on movement rights out of sync with established EU law?
InMcCarthy, as noted, the Court stated that “no element of the situation of
Mrs McCarthy, as described by the national court, indicates that the national
measure at issue in the main proceedings” impacted on her with respect to
either of the two tests: movement rights or enjoyment of the substance of EU
citizenship rights. In other words, the Court was confident that “failure by the
authorities . . . to take into account [her] Irish nationality . . . for the purposes
of granting her a right to residence in the United Kingdom in no way affects
her in her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member
States, or any other right conferred on her by virtue of her status as a Union
citizen”.66
Well, why not? It was acknowledged in section 3.1 that applying for a
residence permit from your own State is unusual. But the Court itselfwidened
the scope of the case beyond the formal options available under the Directive.
It then went on to distinguish Mrs McCarthy’s situation from that in Ruiz
Zambrano, however, on the basis that the effect of the national measure (i.e.
failure to recognize her residence in the UK as an Irish national) did not
requireMrsMcCarthy to leave the territory of theUnion, connecting this point
to her unconditional right to reside in the UK anyway under international
law.67 In contrast, the Court was content to “assume” (para 44) enforced
departure from the Union with respect to the Ruiz Zambrano family. It did this
by detaching their situation from the protective floor provided by international
law through stressing the dependence of the children, in every sense, on their
parents. In other words, a right to remain in Belgium on their own meant
nothing to the children in real terms. We see an even starker emphasis on
dependence in Dereci. Here, the Court stresses the requirement of actual
(im)possibility with respect to staying in the territory of the Union. As noted
above, “mere” economic dependency or desire to keep a family together will
not suffice.
Would the Ruiz Zambrano family have been able to reside lawfully in one of
the other 26 Member States? Critically, they were not asked to find out.Yet, a
few months later in Dereci, the Court established a material distinction
66. Ibid., para 49.
67. Ibid., para 50.
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between enforced departure from the Union and enforced departure from your
home State (something implicit though not articulated in McCarthy). The
extent to which this holds up in light of rights-infused EU case law more
generally is questionable, as discussed in section 4.2 below.We start, for now,
with the Court’s own requirement of (im)possibility.
Article 6(1) of Directive 2004/38 confers a right of residence on Union
citizens in “another Member State” for up to three months “without any
conditions or other formalities”. Article 6(2) extends the same rights to the
Ruiz Zambrano parents, Mr McCarthy and the claimants in Dereci. Since the
Court’s judgment inMetock, we know that prior lawful residence in the Union
is not a precondition.68 That gives all of these families some time, at least, to
attempt to find work or set up a business to support themselves in order to stay
for longer in a host State. So while the Court decreed that the Ruiz Zambrano
family may remain in Belgium,MrsMcCarthy, for example, may reside in the
UK but potentially without her husband (option 1); move to another Member
State (option 2); or leave the Union altogether and move, perhaps, to Jamaica
(option 3). Can any of these options, mirroring choices possibly facing the
families in Dereci too, be construed as depriving her of the substance of her
rights as an EU citizen? On the first point, establishing a right of residence in
your own State under Union law, invoking respect for family life seems central
in normative terms; it did not help the families in Dereci, but that finding is
questioned in section 4.2. The second option, moving to another Member
State, does not deprive Mrs McCarthy of the substance of her citizenship
rights following the clarification in Dereci, but there may be impediments to
her exercising her right to move elsewhere within the Union, returned to in a
moment. Enforced departure to Jamaica (option 3) is clearly analogous to the
facts of Ruiz Zambrano. So why did the Court treat the McCarthy case
differently from Ruiz Zambrano at the time? The Dereci clarification did not
yet exist (option 2) and there may have been a real prospect of her having to
move to Jamaica (option 3). Síofra O’Leary asked a direct question in this
context: “[h]ad the third country national for whom a derived right of
residence was sought been a minor child, a disabled spouse or an aged parent,
would the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by the
status of Union citizen have been called into question?”69 It is absolutely great
but not enough that the Ruiz Zambrano kids are all right. AfterMcCarthy, the
extent to which the Court had intended to create tiers of families for the
purposes of invoking the protection of EU citizenship rights was raised.70
68. Case C-127/08,Metock and Others, [2008] ECR I-6241, para 58.
69. O’Leary, op. cit. supra note 61.
70. Wiesbrock argued strongly against the legitimacy of such an interpretation of
McCarthy, citing Case C-408/03 Commission v. Belgium [2006] ECR I-2647, para 40 and Zhu
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After Dereci, fears that families with children were being privileged over
those without were laid to rest: by ensuring fewer rights for everyone. It would
seem that the Ruiz Zambrano children were, basically, extremely lucky.
4.1.2. So movement is (mostly) back again: but wait, where did it go?
Disentangling, for now, the substance of citizenship rights and asking
independently whether there was any impediment to the exercise of free
movement rights in McCarthy or Dereci, the Court’s dismissal of that
possibility is far from the obviously apparent truth that was presented in the
former case; the question was ignored inDereci, but the same concerns can be
asked about the correctness of that omission.
We saw earlier that the judgment inGarciaAvellowas reasoned through the
“serious inconvenience” principle but that consequence was not, at the time,
linked to an impact on prospective movement rights. The key concern of the
Court was the more internally-focused ambition of “enabl[ing] those children
to bear the surname to which they are entitled according to the law and
tradition of the second Member State.”71 This is actually much closer to an
early expression of the deprivation/genuine enjoyment test than our revised
understanding of the judgment in the language of future impediments to
movement: something that did not occur until Grunkin and Paul, five years
later. In McCarthy, the Court confirms that rationalization of Garcia Avello
through the lens ofGrunkin andPaul – i.e. “whatmatteredwas notwhether the
discrepancy in surnames was the result of the dual nationality of the persons
concerned, but the fact that that discrepancy was liable to cause serious
inconvenience for the Union citizens concerned and constituted an obstacle to
freedom of movement”.72
In McCarthy, Advocate General Kokott had also acknowledged that “the
existence of dual nationality can . . . in principle be entirely relevant when
assessing the legal position of Union citizens vis-à-vis their Member States of
origin”.73 This rationale is based on a solid line of case law.74 The point made
just before the statement is noteworthy too, where the Advocate General
and Chen, cited supra note 3, para 20, as well as the broader “fundamental status” objective in
support of an inclusive reading of EU citizenship; Wiesbrock, “Disentangling the ‘Union
citizenship puzzle’? The McCarthy case”, 36 EL Rev. (2011), at 866–7. Additionally, ECtHR
case law speaks neutrally of “family members” in discussion of the right to respect for family
life, discussed further in section 4.2 infra.
71. Garcia Avello, cited supra note 9, para 45.
72. McCarthy, para 52.
73. McCarthy, Opinion, para 33.
74. A.G. Kokott cites Case C-369/90,Micheletti and Others, [1992] ECR I-4239, para 10;
Garcia Avello, cited supra note 9, para 28; and Zhu and Chen, cited supra note 3, para 39. See
also Case C-138/02, Collins, [2004] ECR I-2703.
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observes that the case “ultimately concerns family unification which is
intended to be achieved circuitously via EU law because domestic law in the
United Kingdom does not permit it.”75 But can this not be said of most cases
that come before the Court through the preliminary reference procedure? Few
national litigants pursue arguments based on EU law owing to some selfless
interest in the European integration project. The generous stance of the
Court with respect to instrumental use of EU law reflects a pragmatic
awareness of this fact, whatever else such an approach might represent in
ideological terms too.
Mrs McCarthy, like the GarciaAvello children, holds dual nationality. This
fact, following established case law, brings her within the personal scope of
EU law. Then, focusing here on the “movement” test in isolation, the question
to determine is whether she is impeded from exercising free movement and
residence rights if she wishes to reside in the UK with her husband, or,
inversely, whether not being able to do so will cause “serious inconvenience”
that cannot be justified by the UK. The spousal relationship was enough to
require in-depth consideration of these questions; Mr McCarthy is a family
member. But even if there was a bias in EU citizenship law at the time that
privileged the rights of children, theMcCarthy case was not the right vehicle
for realizing such a precarious value judgment in any event.While theOpinion
and judgment refer throughout to the applicant and her husband only, Mrs
McCarthy has three children and is the full-time carer of her disabled son.76
Her dependency on State benefits is highlighted in both the Opinion and
judgment, but not the nature of those benefits. Does she receive them because
of her status as a full-time carer? Is this why she is unable to support herself
through other means? How old are her children? Clearly at least one of them
is dependent on her. Are the others? Taking all of this into account, can she
easily uproot her family to move to another Member State? It really would not
seem so. Advocate General Mengozzi’s understanding of dependence in
Dereci seems to leave a door ajar for a future revisiting of these questions,
notwithstanding the Court’s ruling them out of the scope of the “substance” of
citizenship rights in its judgment. Impediments to movement are supposed to
constitute a distinct – and sufficient – test. The Advocate General’s words,
75. McCarthy, Opinion, para 21; see similarly, the first half of para 33, in which the A.G.
alludes nonetheless to the fact that “in the present case everything points to Mrs McCarthy’s
British nationality being the one that is far more real and effective, as she as always lived in
England and applied for her Irish passport solely in the run-up to her request for a residence
permit under EU law”. The Court has insisted, however, andA.G. Kokott clearly accepted, that
instrumental use of EU law is perfectly permissible (see Akrich, cited supra note 32, paras.
55–57; see also, Directive 2004/38, cited supra note 1, Art. 35 of which confirms the Court’s
finding that the threshold of abuse of EU law is set at fraudulent behaviour).
76. See the judgment of the Court of Appeal, cited supra note 17, para 8.
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cited in full in section 3.2.1 above, are worth restating: “[h]ow could a mother
of three young children without her own resources, despite the right of
residence inAustria which she enjoys by virtue of her nationality, take care of
her children if she is unable to work and, therefore, also unable to settle
permanently in another Member State with her family members?” (emphasis
added). Mrs McCarthy’s circumstances could be pasted into that reasoning
rather seamlessly, but the Court does not seem to have considered this.
Thus, even before raising the right to respect for family life, whether the
movement options open to Mrs McCarthy in principle are actually feasible in
practice seems far less likely than the Court presumed. Saying that nothing in
her circumstances as described by the national court (para 49) suggests an
impediment to her movement rights is just not good enough. No such proviso
was added in Ruiz Zambrano. The Court should, in Article 267 TFEU
proceedings, leave determinations of fact to the referring national court. If it is
going to venture into the hazardous territory of offering its own assessments,
then it has a responsibility to establish and consider all relevant facts. It makes
categorical factual statements in both Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy, one to
the benefit of the applicant, the other not. But it should not have done so in
either case. We see a problem of conflation also entering into these
fact-finding statements in the case law: the Court’s conflation of refusal to
grant a work permit with enforced departure from the Union in Ruiz
Zambrano; Advocate General Mengozzi’s conflation of similar issues with
respect to the Dereci family, flagged in section 3.2.1. above. Although the
Court did not engage in any discussion of impediments to movement rights in
Dereci – a huge problem in and of itself, in the interests of analytical rigour as
well as legal certainty – it did at least recognize that determining whether the
situations of the claimant families came within EU law or not was, in fact, a
matter for the national court.
Despite the Court’s undoubted intention inMcCarthy andDereci to contain
the impact of Ruiz Zambrano by reviving the purely internal rule in most
situations, we will probably see an avalanche of further preliminary
references, each one highlighting narrow factual tweaks to test and distinguish
existing case law. This scenario seems profoundly removed from the
objectives of the preliminary reference procedure. It also empowers the Court
in an unusual and dangerous dual way: it becomes at once a lower court
engaged in detailed analyses of facts (but without the knowledge that the
referring court necessarily has, demonstrated acutely by the Court’s failure to
note the existence of children and issues of dependency in McCarthy) and a
constitutional court embedding every one of these factual decisions in a
bizarrely over-detailed matrix of primary Union law.
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Finally, it is worth asking: even if Mrs McCarthy or any of the Union
citizens in Dereci were in a position to reside temporarily in another Member
State, and thereby to effect a purely instrumental trigger of movement and
residence rights (sanctioned by the Court in Akrich andMetock),77 is it really
better to urge EU citizens to engage protection of their rights through this
patently staged route?Why are we required to continue pretending that never
residing in another Member State and residing elsewhere “on purpose” for a
brief period of time are materially different? On a more practical note, how
long would any of them need to stay away from their home States?Would the
three-month window for unconditional residence provided by Article 6 of
Directive 2004/38 be enough? Would less time suffice? In light of the
judgments inMcCarthy andDereci, it is highly likely that these questions will
come up through the preliminary reference procedure, sooner rather than later.
4.2. Legal uncertainty: the Court’s use of “judicial formulas”
Cases at the edges of our current sense of the law sit at the junction of
precedent and reasoning.The resolution of a new point of lawmay be perfectly
predictable, drawing from the building blocks in existing jurisprudence; or it
may be genuinely novel, in the sense that several different outcomes are
rationally possible, at least. In the first case, should predictability ever be
outweighed by other factors?And in the second, how best can the Court arrive
at the “right” outcome? In his work on the controversial judgments in Laval
and Viking Line,78 Loïc Azoulai used the language of “judicial formulas” to
explain the methodology of the Court in terms of how it presents (though not
necessarily arrives at or develops) its reasoning:
“…everything takes place as if the solutions found were the result of a
complex kind of ‘collage’of judicial formulas.Thus, the reasoning behind
these two decisions can easily be reconstructed on the basis of a number of
well-known cases, which each relate to a seminal step in the Court’s case
law . . . It is certain that, in difficult cases, these formulas, which were
forged as part of the reasoning of some of the ‘grands arrêts’ help the
judges to reach a decision. They form the conceptual and ideological
framework of the Court’s reasoning. They act as elements offering
security and permanence in the judicial work. Nevertheless, they do not
dictate the outcome. Finding the actual solution remains a product of
imagination.”79
77. Akrich, cited supra note 32, paras. 55–57;Metock, cited supra note 68, para 75.
78. Case C-341/05, Laval, [2007] ECR I-11767; Case C-438/05, Viking Line, [2007] ECR
I-10779.
79. Azoulai, “The Court of Justice and the social market economy: The emergence of an
ideal and the conditions for its realization”, 45 CML Rev. (2008), 1335 at 1339–1340.
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Notwithstanding the “adaptive capacity” of these judicial formulas, and
shedding interesting light on the use of precedent as a mechanism for
achieving legal certainty, Azoulai traces the problems that emerged from the
application of established free movement law formulas to novel and particular
circumstances in the Laval andViking Line cases. In this way, he demonstrates
how those decisions reveal the limitations of judicial formulas. In McCarthy
andDereci, however, the second problem identified above comes to the fore –
what happens when the Court has to choose between potentially applicable
formulas?
In section 4.1. questions on this theme have already been opened: we saw,
for example, how the “liable to impede movement” formula was applied
differently (thinly inMcCarthy, not at all in Dereci) in cases that are actually
more alike than distinct. But what was most striking about the judgment in
McCarthywas the complete absence of any discussion of the applicant’s right
to respect for family life – a judicial formula that is thoroughly embedded in
jurisprudence on the free movement of persons.At that time, we did not know
how that general principle of EU law connected with the “genuine enjoyment
of the substance of Union citizenship rights”. Looking at the balance of the
Court’s case law beforeMcCarthy, how could it not? But reflecting now on the
strict limitations drawn in Dereci, how do they fit with that broader case law?
And, again, thinking of the result effected in Ruiz Zambrano (even though
respect for family life is notmentioned anywhere in that judgment either), why
did that family receive protection there?
The right to respect for family life – protected by Article 8 ECHR and
Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, but recognized distinctly as a
general principle of EU law – made its first controversial imprint in the
Court’s judgment inCarpenter.80 In her Opinion in Ruiz Zambrano,Advocate
General Sharpston outlined the key features of European Court of Human
Rights case law on the right to respect for family life. Essentially, “removal of
a person from his family members is permissible only when it is shown to be
‘necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social
need and, in particular, proportionate to the aim pursued’.”81 Critically,
however, the ECtHR protects a family’s right to live somewhere; not
somewhere in particular.82 That became the benchmark applied implicitly in
McCarthy and overtly in Dereci. But is it the right benchmark for Union, as
distinct from ECHR, law?
80. Carpenter, cited supra note 24.
81. Ruiz Zambrano, Opinion, para 55, citing relevant case law from the Strasbourg court.
See generally, paras. 54–60 of the Opinion.
82. See further, the case law cited by Wiesbrock, op. cit. supra at note 70, at note 52.
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Mr Carpenter is a British national who resided in the UK but provided
services from time to time in other Member States. The Court found that the
UK’s decision to deport Mrs Carpenter, a national of the Philippines,
contravened her husband’s right to respect for family life, on the following
reasoning:
“[i]t is clear that the separation of Mr and Mrs Carpenter would be
detrimental to their family life and, therefore, to the conditions under
which Mr Carpenter exercises a fundamental freedom. That freedom
could not be fully effective if Mr Carpenter were to be deterred from
exercising it by obstacles raised in his country of origin to the entry and
residence of his spouse.”83
Mr Carpenter submitted that the impact on his freedom to provide services
would be felt through the fact that Mrs Carpenter cared for his children (from
a previous marriage). The extent to which this influenced the decision of the
Court is not clear, as the material paragraph, extracted above, does not hinge
on that particular contribution on Mrs Carpenter’s part.84 In any event, the
forging of family member residence rights through the inherently ephemeral
freedom to provide services was much criticized.85
In subsequent case law, notably MRAX,86 Baumbast87 and Metock,88 the
Court continued to insist that due acknowledgement had to be given by
national authorities to respect for family life – albeit, increasingly, in the safer
normative terrain of Union citizenship. Indeed, in Metock, the Court
acknowledged that its previous insistence, in Akrich,89 that a worker’s third
country national spouse had to demonstrate lawful residence in a Member
State before accompanying that worker to another Member State, had to be
“reconsidered” following the adoption of Directive 2004/38.90 Crucially, the
Court in Metock also emphasized that “if Union citizens were not allowed to
lead a normal family life in the host Member State, the exercise of the
83. Carpenter, judgment, para 39.
84. See also, the more general language of para 42, in which the Court discusses the
ECtHR’s interpretation of Art. 8: “Even though no right of an alien to enter or to reside in a
particular country is as such guaranteed by the Convention, the removal of a person from a
country where close members of his family are living may amount to an infringement of the
right to respect for family life as guaranteed by Article 8(1) of the Convention.”
85. The Editors of this journal, for example, offered a stinging appraisal of the judgment;
“Editorial comments: Freedoms unlimited?” 40 CML Rev. (2003), 537.
86. Case C-459/99, Mouvement contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie ASBL
(MRAX), [2002] ECR I-6591.
87. Baumbast and R, cited supra note 9.
88. Metock and Others, cited supra note 68.
89. Akrich, cited supra note 32.
90. Metock, cited supra note 68, para 58.
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freedoms they are guaranteed by the Treaty would be seriously obstructed.”91
Moreover, the net result of most of these cases was not a family member’s
right of residence in a host State, but in the Union citizen’s home State.
In McCarthy – or in Ruiz Zambrano – there is no discussion on the right to
respect for family life: at all. In Ruiz Zambrano, the Court construes the
potential departure of minor Union citizens from the territory of the Union as
a deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights.
It may seem odd that the right to respect for family life is not mentioned, but
in strict terms, it is not needed given the Court’s approach to the resolution of
the case. And because of the Court’s breaching of the wholly internal
paradigm, it may also be a strategic omission – rememberingArticle 51(2) of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court would have wanted to avoid any
charges of “new” competence-creating. Given that theTreaty simply creates a
right to reside “within the territory of theMember States”, however, breaching
the wholly internal rule to protect the rights of EU citizens would not
necessarily be a new competence in strict terms; as argued above, it is more a
political or constitutional than technically legal revolution. Protection of a
right to reside would be the primary objective, with the right to respect for
family life then infusing that protection in a secondary sense. The Charter per
se would not, therefore, be “modify[ing] powers and tasks defined by the
Treaties” (emphasis added).
The absence of consideration of fundamental rights in McCarthy cannot,
however, be overlooked, given that the Court engaged with impediments to
MrsMcCarthy’s right to move and not just the deprivation/genuine enjoyment
test. In the context ofAdvocate General Kokott’s Opinion, the omissionwas at
least rational; she did not believe that the circumstances of the case could
come within the scope of EU law at all, and she thus pointed to the obligations
of the UK with respect to the ECHR as the applicant’s only potential avenue
for redress. In section 4.1., it was observed that the Court probably assumed
that the McCarthys could simply reside elsewhere in the Union since, relying
on Metock, Mr McCarthy would not need to demonstrate that he had resided
lawfully in the UK to begin with. But that was never explained in the
judgment. Moreover, why not offer the same advice to the Ruiz Zambrano
children? Furthermore, neither the Ruiz Zambrano children (via their parents)
nor Mrs McCarthy were self-sufficient at the time of their respective cases, so
that factor cannot, of itself, constitute a sufficient distinguishing feature.
Furthermore, a Union citizen does not have to meet the self-sufficiency
91. Ibid., para 62; in para 56, the Court cites six authorities for the same point, beginning
with Carpenter. The origins of the reasoning can be found also in Singh, cited supra note 24.
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requirements laid down in Directive 2004/38 through their own enterprise.92
Conversely, inDereci, the self-sufficiency of the families involvedwithout the
input of the third country national applicants was emphasized expressly in
both the Opinion and judgment.
Linking respect for family life with the impediments to movement test, we
have to focus on the prospective exercise of those rights in bothMcCarthy and
Dereci, given that none of theUnion citizens involved hadmoved anywhere by
the time of the proceedings.93 The reasoning of the Court in Garcia Avello is
worth returning to on this point:
“[A] link with Community law does…exist in regard to persons in a
situation such as that of the children of Mr Garcia Avello, who are
nationals of oneMember State lawfully resident in the territory of another
Member State. That conclusion cannot be invalidated by the fact that the
children involved in the main proceedings also have the nationality of the
Member State in which they have been resident since their birth and
which, according to the authorities of that State, is by virtue of that fact the
only nationality recognized by the latter. It is not permissible for aMember
State to restrict the effects of the grant of the nationality of another
Member State by imposing an additional condition for recognition of that
nationality with a view to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms
provided for in the Treaty….”94
It was argued above that the implications of this finding should have been
relevant for MrsMcCarthy even beforewe get on to the secondary question of
her right to respect for family life.95 But even without dual nationality, adding
the two formulas (respect for family life + impediments to movement)
together, and reflecting again on the various spousal and other family
relationships in Dereci (and, in particular, on Mrs McCarthy’s status as the
full-time carer for her disabled son), far less has been accepted by the Court as
constituting an obstacle to movement, including the “serious inconvenience”
likely to be caused by differing forms of surnames in Garcia Avello and, in
Carpenter, the fact that the exercise of Treaty freedoms “could not be fully
effective if [an applicant] were to be deterred from [their exercise] by obstacles
raised in [their] country of origin to the entry and residence of [their] spouse”.
92. Zhu and Chen, cited supra note 3, para 33; confirmed in Case C-408/03,Commission v.
Belgium, [2006] ECR I-2647, paras. 40–51.
93. But: recall the additional angle of Mrs McCarthy’s dual nationality, discussed supra.
94. Garcia Avello, cited supra note 9, paras. 27–29 (emphasis added), citing Micheletti,
cited supra note 74, para 10.
95. Although not explained, this was also a strand of the argument submitted by the Greek
Government in Dereci, see para 43 of the judgment.
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How can uprooting a family possibly be seen as less “serious” than
surname-use “inconvenience”?
There is simply no engagement with these points in McCarthy or Dereci.
The discussion on family life in the latter case is related exclusively to the
deprivation/genuine enjoyment test. It was noted in section 3.2.2 above that
the Court directed the Member States to their obligations under the ECHR
when situations fall outside the scope of EU law, as it had done in Akrich.
Interpreting this mandate in the kindest light, the Court is here recognizing the
fact of intertwined legal orders. It is effecting a pluralist understanding of
contemporary constitutional obligations, which stem from different legal
orders at both State and transnational levels. In his View in Dereci, Advocate
General Mengozzi expresses the same point in a less condescending way,
reflecting on the “complementary” dynamics of the national, Union and
ECHR legal orders, and noting that respect for family life in purely internal
situations must be managed through the first and third of those orders only.96
There is much merit to this proposition; not least from the perspective of
proper respect for competence boundaries, an objective given particular
weight through the Lisbon Treaty process.
The acceptance of impediments to prospective movement as a sufficient
cross-border connection is undoubtedly hugely expansive; it has the potential
to bring virtually anything within the scope of free “movement” law. But, like
it or not, it has long happened. Furthermore, in cases likeCarpenter, the Court
had already crossed another line in protecting family life, beyond the floor of
protection demanded by the ECtHR and, in effect, protecting a home State
right of residence for EU market actors. In Ruiz Zambrano, it crossed another
one, protecting the same right for Union citizens. Since then, it has tried to
retrace its steps, but it is trampling established lines of its own case law in the
process. Meanwhile, national courts continue to ask the Court to pin down the
edges of EU citizenship law.97 One might ask why they persist in the repeated
sending of very similar questions. But why shouldn’t they? After all, there is
always the possibility of another Ruiz Zambrano paradigm shift. The
implications of this facts-driven pattern for the Court are troubling in
institutional terms, however, as explained in section 4.1. above. The Court is
trying to be both local immigration adjudicator and supranational
standard-setter in these cases: but this is not proving to be an effective or
appropriate blend of functions, and the performance of both is now suffering.
Commenting on the overall thrust of the case law on citizenship, O’Leary
suggests that “it is not that the Court hasmade a choice between legal certainty
and the protection of fundamental rights, opting for the latter at the expense of
96. Dereci, A.G. Mengozzi, para 40.
97. See again the references cited supra note 50.
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expense of the former, but . . . in determining the scope of application of EU
law, fundamental rights considerations, even if explicit reference is not made
to them, may have an increasingly important role to play.”98 Looking across
the bigger picture of EU citizenship jurisprudence, this is right, empirically, in
the sense that the posited choice would explain many of the Court’s decisions.
But is it right from a conceptual perspective, taking into account the rule of law
and legal certainty? The case law has become so individualistic, so
facts-specific, as to raise accusations of arbitrariness. In rapid response toRuiz
Zambrano, I argued that seeking to effect the protection of fundamental rights
goes a long way towards redressing the balance of concern with respect to
legitimacy and charges of undue judicial activism. But then, fundamental
rights have to be protected consistently, or their engagement as an appropriate
motivation, even in explanatory terms, will continue to be called into
question.99 The judgment inMcCarthy brought those concerns into strikingly
sharp relief. The response in Dereci tries to imprint more coherence
retrospectively, but through the high price of reducing the level of protection
for family life below that seen in previous cases and ignoring the implications
for prospective movement, despite the latter being another seemingly
entrenched strand of EU law. In Ruiz Zambrano, Advocate General Sharpston
suggested that “[l]ottery rather than logic would seem to be governing the
exercise of EU citizenship rights”.100 Reflecting on the use – and non-use – of
apposite judicial formulas inMcCarthy and Dereci, it is difficult to disagree.
5. Conclusion
Wemay not like or even approve of developments in the case law of the Court
of Justice. But we must work with(in) the case law that we have. Legal
certainty dictates that the Court should do the same. It must either endeavour
to weave its case law logically together or, if there are good reasons to push the
law in a different direction, articulate its reasoning as clearly and explicitly as
possible. The circumstances in Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci were
98. O’Leary, op. cit. supra note 61.
99. Nic Shuibhne, “Editorial: Seven questions for seven paragraphs (Editorial)”, 36 ELRev.
(2011), 161 at 162: “[T]here is a family at the heart of this case, a family living under constant
strain for almost a decade . . . But however much the Court of Justice might want to help, and
I believe this to be the motivation underpinning its judgment, it is simply not constitutionally
possible or legitimate for the Court to resolve every breach of fundamental rights that occurs.
Or, if it is truly serious about pushing the constitutional reach of EU law this far, then be open
about it, be thorough, be direct, and persuade us as to why this must be the outcome . . . The
Court is trying to do good things in individual cases; but it cannot continue to ignore the
systemic legitimacy – and credibility – consequences of this choice.”
100. Ruiz Zambrano, Opinion, para 88.
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either all purely internal to one Member State, on a strict construction of the
plain facts (and diluting the dual nationality point inMcCarthy); or the actual
likelihood of forced departure from the Union should have been established
rather than presumed in all of them, via the referring courts; or they should all
comewithin amore rights-infused deprivation/genuine enjoyment test; and/or
the catch-all net of impediments to prospective movement (drawing from case
law such as Garcia Avello and Rottmann).
All three references were really about the extent to which national
immigration authorities should be mindful of the right to respect for family
life in cases involving the third country national family members of their own
citizens. The Strasbourg court is indeed the proper place for the resolution of
these questions if the wholly internal rule is retained in EU law and/or if the
case law on prospective movement is modified significantly or even reversed.
In Ruiz Zambrano, however, the Court moved the law on from the first
fundamental premise. InMcCarthy, it struggled to pretend that it didn’t and it
fudged the second (movement) dimension. In Dereci, it fastened both harder
edges into place. The Court may have wished to be seen as construing Ruiz
Zambrano narrowly in order to dampen controversy stirred in the wake of that
judgment. With respect, the horse had already bolted. More fundamentally:
reducing the degree of protection in certain cases that has already been
extended in others is just unacceptable, on so many levels.
From time to time, EU citizens like Jacqueline Forster, Shirley McCarthy
andMurat Dereci earn the dubious distinction of paying a price for significant
developments in the law that precede their claims. It may be a rudimentary
yardstick, but when an area of law becomes almost impossible to explain, to
teach or to advise, then something is seriously wrong. EU citizenship law falls
within that category at present. Few constitutional courts get, or take, “three
goes” to work out fundamental concepts in the way we have seen in this case
law, and most certainly not in one year. This Court has emphasized the speedy
delivery of judgments as a strategic priority in recent years. But if the recent
trilogy of rushed attempts is the result of that ambition, it should revert to
taking its time.
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